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THE IMPLICATIONS OF USING THE
MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION OF




For millions of people, the dream of becoming a parent repre-
sents life's ultimate goal. Some couples achieve this dream through
little more than good timing or even a happy accident. But, for a
growing number of men and women, conceiving a child remains an
elusive ambition.1 Infertility is as old as the Bible, 2 yet modem
medicine provides options for infertile couples that would astound
past generations. 3 Science can now combine sperm and egg to begin
life in a laboratory, 4 and many couples choose to endure every medi-
cal possibility for the chance to create a new life.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2004; B.A., Government
and International Studies, Sociology, University of Notre Dame, 2001. I would like to
thank Professor Michael Kirsch for his invaluable comments and suggestions, and the
members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their hard work and attention to detail.
This Note is dedicated to my parents, Ronald and Patricia, for their unconditional
love and encouragement, and for teaching me by example that with perseverance and
faith, all things are possible.
1 See James B. Roche, After Bragdon v. Abbot: Why Legislation is Still Needed to
Mandate Infertility Insurance, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 215, 215 (2002); Thomas D. Flani-
gan, Note, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Insurance Under the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act of 1990, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 777, 777 (2000) ("One study estimates the number
of American couples dealing with infertility will be 6.3 million in the year 2000, and
approximately 7.7 million in 2025."); Shorge Sato, Note, A Little Bit Disabled: Infertility
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 5 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 193 (2001).
2 "Now Sarai Abram's wife bare him no children.., and Sarai said unto Abram,
Behold now, the LORD hath restrained me from bearing .... " Genesis 16:1-2.
3 See, e.g., Aaron C. McKee, Note, The American Dream-2.5 Kids and a White Picket
Fence: The Need for Federal Legislation to Protect the Insurance Rights of Infertile Couples, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 191, 194 (2000).
4 See id.
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Yet this advanced technology comes with a hefty price tag. 5 Fund-
ing a chance to become a parent can break the bank.6 Health insur-
ance, the traditional answer to medical catastrophes, provides little to
no coverage for assisted reproductive technologies, or ART.7 This
forces the vast majority of infertile couples who undergo ART to pay
thousands of dollars, out of pocket, to pursue their goal of
parenthood. 8
Existing simultaneously with man's inherent urge to reproduce is
the mundane arena of federal income taxes-an unlikely combina-
tion, for certain. Yet Congress has created provisions in the Tax Code
to aid taxpayers in special circumstances. 9 These provisions, called tax
expenditures, act as revenue losses for the federal government in or-
der to grant special tax relief to certain taxpayers.10 Additionally, tax
expenditures may exist in an attempt to accurately reflect the income
of the taxpayer," such as the exclusion of scholarship income from
one's taxable base.12
Tax policy and infertility collide in I.R.C. § 213, the deduction for
extraordinary medical expenses.' 3 Generally, taxpayers may deduct
out of pocket expenses for medical treatment that exceeds a percent-
age based numerical floor from their annual incomes. 14 This Note
will trace the use of ART as a response to the infertility crisis, point out
the characteristics that make ART an "ideal" expense for the § 213
deduction, and then examine the implications of the intersection be-
tween the medical expense deduction and fertility treatment. Specifi-
cally, Part I sets forth the problem of infertility in America, the
treatments, and the financial costs. Part II examines the current state
of insurance coverage of fertility treatments, including an overview of
the response from the Americans with Disabilities Act. Part III posits
why assisted reproductive technologies present an exemplary case for
the use of the § 213 deduction. Part IV addresses the implications of
using the present deduction to subsidize fertility treatment. Finally,
this Note concludes by offering a solution that allows for the use of
5 See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 26-32, 154-55 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
9 See ALAN GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION 163 (5th ed. 2002).
10 Id.
11 See GUNN & WARD, supra note 9, at 166.
12 See I.R.C. § 117 (2000).
13 Id. § 213.
14 Id. § 213(a).
1118 [VOL. 79:3
20041 I.R.C. § 213 AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 1119
the medical expense deduction in a manner consistent with both leg-
islative goals and the personal welfare of millions of individuals who
cannot conceive a child.
I. INFERTILITY IN AMERICA: PREVALENCE, TREATMENT,
AND FINANCIAL COSTS
One of the most tragic experiences that a couple may face is the
physical inability to bear children. Infertility is medically defined as
the failure to conceive within one year of unprotected intercourse or
the inability to carry a pregnancy to full term.15 Under this definition,
infertility affects over six million American couples,16 or ten percent
of Americans of reproductive age. 17 Infertility is on the rise in this
country, placing an increasing number of people into a monthly cycle
of hope and despair.18
Fortunately, modern reproductive treatments have provided the
answer for a growing number of couples.1 9 It is estimated that almost
two million people take advantage of some type of infertility service
annually.20 These infertility treatments include drug therapy, artificial
insemination, gestational carriers, and a group of embryo transfer
technologies known collectively as assisted reproductive technologies,
or ART.21 ART consists of gamete intra fallopian transfer (GIFT), zy-
gote intra fallopian transfer (ZIFT), and in vitro fertilization (1VF).22
IVF, GIFT, and ZIT are similar treatments that involve stimulation of
the ovaries, surgical egg retrieval, combining the eggs and sperm in a
laboratory, and development of the embryo in the uterus. 2 3 This era
of technology driven fertility procedures has grown dramatically and
shows no signs of abating-American doctors performed almost thirty
15 McKee, supra note 3, at 192.
16 Roche, supra note 1, at 215.
17 McKee, supra note 3, at 192.
18 Flanigan, supra note 1, at 777; Sato, supra note 1, at 193.
19 For consistency, I refer to infertile couples throughout this Note. Of course,
many single men and women face infertility as individuals, and every concern raised
in this Note applies equally to their plight.
20 Flanigan, supra note 1, at 779.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 780. This Note will focus only on the implications of the use of such
embryo transfer technologies to treat infertility. This is not to undermine the fact
that most infertile couples find cost effective success through fertility drugs and artifi-
cial insemination; however, this Note considers the implications of the most extreme
cases of expensive, high-tech fertility treatment only. See id. (noting the effectiveness
of fertility drugs and artificial insemination).
23 See McKee, supra note 3, at 194.
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times more ART procedures in 1998 than in 1985.24 As rates of infer-
tility continue to increase, 25 the potential use of ART seems limitless.
However, most of these advanced fertility treatments are quite
costly. Such costs can be difficult to quantify, especially when inter-
twined with the costs of diagnosis. 26 Generally, high-tech artificial re-
productive technologies cost approximately $10,000 for each
attempt.2 7 In this country, the estimated cost per IVF cycle in 2001
was $9226,28 and the average success rate of IVF is 20% per cycle. 29
The cost per live birth of a baby conceived with ART has been esti-
mated at close to $60,000, 30 yet this figure does not account for the
age of the mother. Since pregnancy rates decline and incidents of
miscarriage rise with age, IVF costs per live birth are estimated at
more than three times higher for women over forty than for women
under thirty.3 1 Overall, infertile couples spend at least $1 billion dol-
lars every year in their quest to become biological parents-a figure
that has increased over 500% in the past two decades.
3 2
Infertility is an increasing problem for many American couples.
Modern medicine has advanced significant treatments to address the
issue, but these treatments can break the bank. Even with such a high
price tag, the amount of couples enduring ART grows each year. How
can these couples, desperate to achieve a successful pregnancy, afford
such treatment? Health insurance seems to be the only answer. But
how has the insurance industry responded to the demand for cover-
age of assisted reproductive technology?
24 Patricia Katz et al., The Economic Impact of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 4
NATURE CELL BIOLOGY 1, S29 (2002), available at http://www.nature.com/cgi-taf/
dynapage.taf?file=/fertility/content/full/ncb-nm-fertilitys29.html. ART procedures
performed in the United States have increased from 2389 in 1985 to 61,294 in 1998.
See id.
25 Erin Lynn Connolly, Note, Constitutional Issues Raised by States'Exclusion of Fertil-
ity Drugs from Medicaid Coverage in Light of Mandated Coverage of Viagra, 54 Vand. L. Rev.
451, 461 & n.55 (2001).
26 Advanced Reproductive Care, Inc., Effectiveness of Treatment with Donor Gametes,
at http://www.arcfertility.com/infertility/treatment-donor-gametes.html (last visited
Feb. 4, 2004).
27 McKee, supra note 3, at 195.
28 See Katz et al., supra note 24, at S30.
29 Advanced Reproductive Care, Inc. supra note 26.
30 See Katz et al., supra note 24, at S30.
31 Id. The median age for women undergoing IVF is thirty-six. Id.
32 Kevin Yamamoto & Shelby A.D. Moore, A Trust Analysis of a Gestational Carrier's
Right to Abortion, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 103 n.42 (2001).
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
FERTILITY TREATMENT
A. Federal and State Legislation
Infertile couples who turn to their employer insurance plans to
cover their fertility efforts often encounter a closed door. Only one in
four employers cover some form of fertility services, and ARTs, the
most expensive fertility treatments, are unlikely to be included. 33 As
requests to individual employers have fallen upon deaf ears, propo-
nents of infertility rights turned to the legislature to request fertility
coverage under employer health plans. At both the federal and state
levels, lobbyists have encouraged legislation that requires coverage of
assisted reproductive technology in employee health plans.
Efforts to implement such a sweeping mandate have been unsuc-
cessful at the federal level. For instance, in 2001 Representative Rob-
ert Andrews of New Jersey introduced The Equity and Fertility
Coverage Act. 34 The bill was intended to assure equitable treatment
of fertility and impotence in health care coverage under group health
plans and health benefits programs.35 In practice, such legislation
would have required insurance providers covering treatment for im-
potence to cover fertility treatment; however, the provider could have
capped the amount of coverage, or chosen to cover neither impo-
tence nor infertility.36 House subcommittees on health, labor-man-
agement relations, and agency organization considered H.R. 568, yet
the bill failed to emerge from any committee and stalled a month
after its initial introduction.
3 7
Under state legislation, insurance coverage of fertility treatments
tends to be the exception rather than the rule.38 Only two states, Mas-
sachusetts and Rhode Island, have enacted legislation that requires
broad insurance coverage for fertility treatments. 39 These statutes de-
mand that any policy which includes pregnancy services must also
cover the diagnosis and treatment of infertility. 40 Although thirteen
states mandate some coverage of infertility treatments, these require-
33 Id. at 104 n.43.
34 The Equity in Fertility Coverage Act of 2001, H.R. 568, 107th Cong. (2001).
35 Id.
36 Id. § 714.
37 See Library of Cong., Bill Summary and Status for the 107th Congress, H.R 568, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl08query.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (on file with
author).
38 Sato, supra note 1, at 197.
39 Yamamoto & Moore, supra note 32, at 104 n.44.
40 See id.
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ments do not encompass employer funded health benefit plans be-
cause of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.4 1 In the
thirty-seven states without any laws for infertility coverage, infertile
couples pay for the treatment largely out of their own pockets.
42
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act
As advocates of mandatory fertility coverage have found little suc-
cess in legislating the issue directly, proponents have attempted to ap-
ply existing federal legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act, to
the infertile population.
Congress created the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the
Act) in 1990 to respond to a history of civil rights discrimination
against the disabled population. 43 Among its numerous provisions,
the Act forbids employers from discriminating in the allocation of
workplace benefits between disabled and nondisabled employees.
44
With the advent of federal protection for disabled workers, infer-
tile women seized upon the legislation as an answer to their medical
needs. In the past decade, infertile women have filed lawsuits against
their employers alleging that certain workplace conditions violate the
ADA.4 5 Battles have been waged over a television station discharging a
41 Sato, supra note 1, at 197 (explaining the limits of certain state mandates).
42 See id.
43 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (2000).
44 See id. § 12,112. Determining the precise workplace benefits that fall under the
scope of the ADA is a topic unto itself for commentary and controversy. The scope of
such a debate exceeds the inquiry of this Note. The controversy includes such ques-
tions as whether insurance plans fall under Title I or Title III of the ADA, what poli-
cies constitute discrimination in the context of insurance, whether the ADA governs
the disparate effects of facially neutral policies, and the scope of the ADA's jurisdic-
tion within and across various disabilities. For purposes of this Note, it is enough to
rest on the general consensus that the ADA forbids discrimination against disabled
employees in the receipt of workplace benefits. For insight into this vast arena, see
generally Jeffrey S. Manning, Are Insurance Companies Liable Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 607 (2000) (arguing that the ADA forbids disability
based discrimination in selling insurance policies and defines discrimination as mak-
ing disability based insurance decisions without consulting actuarial tables); Jesse A.
Langer, Note, Combating Discriminatory Insurance Practices: Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 435 (2000) (concluding that Title III of the ADA
should be construed as allowing claims for discriminatory insurance practices); Luke
A. Sobota, Comment, Does Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act Regulate Insur-
ance?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 (1999) (arguing that the ADA requires only physical
access to public accommodations and does not cover insurance).
45 See, e.g., LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. Mich.
2001); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Neimeier v.
Tri-State Fire Prot. Dist., No. 99-C-7391, 2000 WL 1222207 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2000);
[VOL. 79:31122
2004] I.R.C. § 213 AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 1123
news anchor for excessive absences during her fertility treatment,46 a
pharmacist requesting extra sick days to undergo in vitro fertiliza-
tion,47 and employees questioning the lack of fertility treatment cover-
age in their employer health plans.
48
For plaintiffs to win, they must convince the courts of two condi-
tions. First, infertility must constitute a protected disability under the
ADA. Second, the ADA must prevent employers from discriminating
against the disabled by refusing to accommodate fertility treatment in
their insurance plans. In this budding area of the law, most litigation
has focused on the first issue: whether infertility qualifies as a disability
under the ADA. The Supreme Court may have resolved this dispute
over the definition of disability in 1998 with Bragdon v. Abbot,49 yet
questions abound over the applicability of Bragdon to the world of in-
fertility. This Note will now examine the debate over whether the
Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to cover fertility
treatment in their employee insurance plans.
1. Is Infertility a Disability Under the ADA?
For the past decade, courts have encountered the intersection of
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the condition of medical infer-
tility. A standard fact pattern for such cases involves an infertile plain-
tiff alleging that the lack of infertility treatment coverage in an
employee insurance plan violates the ADA. 50 To begin, courts ex-
amine whether the infertile plaintiff suffers from a disability as de-
fined by federal legislation. 51 If the infertile plaintiff is not disabled,
she cannot find relief under the ADA. 5
2
The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an]
individual." 53 For analysis, we may break the definition into two parts:
Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95-C-3834, 1997 WL 106257 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 10, 1997); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Iowa
1995); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Zatarain v.
WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995).
46 Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 241-42.
47 LaPorta, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
48 Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21; Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 105.
49 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
50 Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21; Niemeier, 2000 WL 1222207, at *1; Krauel 915
F. Supp. at 105-06.
51 See supra note 45.
52 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination against only
"qualified individual [s] with a disability because of the disability").
53 Id. § 12,102 (2) (A). The statute lists two other parts to the definition. The
term disability also means "a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as
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(1) whether infertility is "a physical or mental impairment," and (2)
whether the impairment interferes with a "major life activity."
One judge found the answer self-evident as he held that infertility
was a clear physical impairment.54 Other courts give the issue a bit
more reflection, and have looked to the ADA's federal regulations for
help in determining what constitutes a physical or mental impair-
ment.55 Under federal regulations, an impairment is "a physiological
disorder ... affecting one or more of the following body systems[,] ...
[including the] reproductive [system].'56 While a physical abnormal-
ity causing infertility satisfies this definition, 57 some couples do not
have a medical explanation for their infertility.58 However, because
courts generally have accepted that infertility is a physical impair-
ment,59 we will assume that the typical infertile plaintiff can satisfy this
first branch of the ADA definition.
If a plaintiff fulfills the first clause of the ADA definition, the next
question turns upon whether infertility substantially limits a major life
activity. Most litigation in fertility cases has centered on whether re-
having such an impairment." Id. § 12,102 (2)(B)-(C). Since most of the litigation
and commentary has focused on the first part of the definition, the inquiry of this
Note will be similarly limited to the first strand.
54 "It defies common sense to say that infertility is not a physiological disorder
.... .Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
55 See id.; Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1995);
Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 242 (E.D. La. 1995).
56 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1) (2003).
57 Infertility is a medical condition recognized by the American College of Ob-
stetrics and Gynecologists and defined as "the inability to conceive within one year or
the inability to carry a pregnancy." McKee, supra note 3, at 192 (quoting I. Ray King,
Treating Infertility Not That Expensive, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL; Oct. 17, 2000, at A9).
58 "Approximately twenty percent of all infertility [sic] cannot be explained." Id.
at 193. Presumably, some of these cases of infertility are due to the inevitable conse-
quences of aging, and not to any physical impairment with the reproductive system.
Under the federal regulations, menopausal infertility would probably not fulfill the
definition of a physical impairment because it is not a physical abnormality of the
reproductive system (assuming that the woman has reached an accepted age for men-
opause.) See McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 (D. Minn.
1998) (noting that menopause itself is not a disability under the ADA because it is an
"entirely normal consequence of human aging"). But see Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.,
117 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (refraining from addressing the "fasci-
nating question" of whether premature menopause, "the abnormally early onset of an
otherwise normal bodily process," constitutes a disability under the ADA).
59 See, e.g., Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243 ("[T] he Court cannot find as a matter of
law that plaintiff does not have an impairment in the nature of a physiological disor-
der of the reproductive system.").
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production is a major life activity as defined by the ADA.60 If repro-
duction is a major life activity, then infertility fulfills the second
element of the test for a disability.
The question of whether reproduction is a major life activity has
dominated the judicial focus of this field for the past decade, with
federal courts divided on the answer. While the ADA does not define
a major life activity, federal regulations enumerate the standards. 61
The regulation states that "[m] ajor [1] ife [a] ctivities means functions
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.'' 62 Defendants
have used this definition to argue that Congress meant to exclude re-
production as a major life activity. They claim that the list of exam-
ples stresses independent activities, while reproduction requires
participation from two individuals. 63 Judges have also used the regula-
tions to hold that reproduction, unlike breathing, seeing, or hearing,
is a lifestyle choice, and not a necessary life activity. 64 Courts also dis-
tinguish reproduction from the list of other major life activities by its
less frequent occurrence. 65
However, policy problems may arise by denying reproduction the
status of a major life activity. One opinion points out that denying
reproduction the status of a major life activity is inconsistent with pro-
tections Congress has afforded to pregnancy and childbearing, in leg-
islation such as the Family and Medical Leave Act 66 as well as the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act.6 7 In light of these federal protections,
a narrow interpretation of reproduction reduces it to nothing more
than a lifestyle choice.
With federal courts divided on the issue of whether reproduction
is a major life activity, the issue was ripe for the Supreme Court to
intervene. They did so, but in a manner quite different than in the
traditional infertility context.
60 See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co, 916 F. Supp. 797, 801-04 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106-08 (S.D. Iowa 1995);
Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243-44.
61 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
62 "Id.
63 See Erickson v Bd. of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
64 See Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 106.
65 See id.; Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243.
66 See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000); see also Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen &
Dixon, No. 95-C-3834, 1997 WL 106257, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1997).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
2. Bragdon v. Abbott Ending the Debate?
A specific point of contention marked the debate over whether
infertility met the ADA definition of a disability. Federal courts dif-
fered on whether reproduction was a major life activity, and the Su-
preme Court's answer would have tremendous implications. If
reproduction was a major life activity, then physical impairment sub-
stantially limiting reproduction should constitute a disability. Infertil-
ity is that physical impairment.
Bragdon v. Abbott 68 was not a debate over infertility. In fact, the
Supreme Court made no mention of infertility in the entire opinion.
Bragdon is a case about the rights of people who are HIV positive
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Sidney Abbott suffered from asymptomatic HIV.69 She alleged
that her dentist, Randon Bragdon, violated the ADA by refusing to fill
her cavity in his office.70 To present a valid claim, Ms. Abbott had to
qualify as a person with a disability under the ADA.71 She argued that
her HIV status constituted a disability because it was a physical impair-
ment that substantially limited a major life activity. 72 Her impaired
life activity, she argued, was her inability to reproduce.
73
In a five to four decision, the Court agreed with Ms. Abbott.
7 4
The Court held that reproduction is a major life activity, and because
HIV substantially limits the ability to reproduce, people suffering from
HIV are disabled under the ADA.7 5 But as the focus of the case was
the disability status of HIV and not of infertility, the applicability of
the opinion to the infertility debate is unclear.
Even with questions regarding Bragdon's applicability to infertil-
ity, reproductive rights proponents hailed Bragdon as a tremendous
victory.76 Some scholars viewed the majority's key holding that repro-
duction is a major life activity as an end to the debate among lower
courts over the status of infertility as a disability. 77 However, even with
68 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
69 Id. at 628.
70 Id. at 629.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 632-42.
73 Id. at 637. While not physically impossible to reproduce, Ms. Abbott's attempts
to reproduce would pose a severe health risk both to her sexual partner and to her
future child. Id. at 639-40.
74 Id. at 627.
75 See id. at 637-42.
76 Sato, supra note 1, at 189-90.
77 See id.
1126 [VOL- 79:3
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Bragdon's definition of reproduction as a major life activity, the legal
battle for ADA protections for infertility continued.
3. Bragdon's First Test: Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.
A case arose just months after Bragdon that addressed its holding
in the infertility context. In Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.,78 Rochelle Saks
brought suit against her employer, a book publisher.79 Ms. Saks suf-
fered from medically diagnosed infertility and underwent costly surgi-
cal treatment, which her employer health plan refused to cover.80
Saks sued her employer, Franklin Covey, alleging (1) that she was dis-
abled under the ADA, and (2) that Covey's health benefits plan vio-
lated the ADA by discriminating against her disability in excluding
"surgical impregnation procedures" such as in vitro fertilization and
artificial insemination. 81
Leading up to the case, legal pundits expected the controversy to
center around the ADA definition of a disability.8 2 As Bragdon held
that reproduction is a major life activity, it seemed logical that the
physical limitation of this major life activity should fulfill the legal defi-
nition of a disability.83 Furthermore, if infertility is a disability, the
ADA should prevent discrimination against infertility in employer
health plans.8
4
Much to the surprise of the legal community, the "infertility as a
disability" question provided the beginning of the analysis, but not the
end of the matter. The district judge held that Ms. Saks was indeed
disabled under the ADA because she suffered from infertility, and this
gave her standing to bring the case.8 5 However, Ms. Saks lost her case
on summary judgment.8 6
The court dismissed Ms. Saks' case because she failed to prove
discrimination, a required element for an ADA claim.8 7 Discrimina-
78 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 316 F.3d
337 (2d Cir., 2003).
79 Id. at 319-21.
80 Id. at 322-23.
81 Id. at 319-21.
82 See Sato, supra note 1, at 208.
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 See Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
86 Id. at 321.
87 See id. at 326-27. The ADA prohibits discrimination against "a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em-
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment." 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (2000).
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tion did not exist in her claim because Ms. Saks had equal access to
the same insurance policy as her nondisabled coworkers; the plan ex-
cluded coverage for surgical impregnation procedures for every em-
ployee, regardless of their fertility status.88 The court relied on
precedent from various circuit courts in holding that "insurance dis-
tinctions that apply equally to all insured employees do not discrimi-
nate on the basis of disability."8 9 The opinion stressed that insurers
are under no obligation to provide equal benefits across disabilities,
even though the limitation "hits infertile employees like Ms. Saks
harder than it hits other employees .... -90 Because all employees
faced the same limitation, the court did not find the requisite discrim-
ination necessary for an ADA claim.
Advocates of infertility rights criticized the decision.9 1 Yet Saks
has remained the law for determining the applicability of the ADA to
infertility. While infertility may constitute a disability under the ADA,
the ADA does not require employers to cover fertility treatment in
employee health insurance plans.
III. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: CONDITIONS RIPE FOR
THE MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION
As this Note has examined, infertility is a widespread, growing
problem in this country, and assisted reproductive technology is be-
coming an increasingly popular method to treat infertility. ART is as
costly as it is prevalent, with the price of a live birth estimated at
$60,000 for a single child.92 With the incidents of fertility treatment
on the rise, how can American couples pay for the expense? Federal
and state laws do not require employers to cover ART in their em-
ployee health plans. Spurned by the legislature, fertility advocates at-
tempted to apply the protections of the Americans with Disabilities
Act to infertile couples. After years of litigation and a nod from the
Supreme Court, the current law states that the ADA may protect infer-
tile patients in some areas, but it does not mandate employer health
insurance for fertility treatments.
88 See Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 326-27.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 327.
91 See, e.g., Valerie Gutmann, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Failure to Cover Does
Not Violate ADA, Title VII, orPDA, 31J.L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 316 (2003) ("[A]lthough
Saks can be seen as a step in the right direction by recognizing infertility as a disability
under the ADA, it continues the restriction of coverage under employer benefits
plans."); Sato, supra note 1, at 206-23.
92 See Katz et al., supra note 24, at 530.
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The answer to this inquiry seems clear: infertile couples pay for
the chance at parenthood out of their own pockets. Statistics show
that patients bear approximately 85% of fertility costs themselves be-
cause they lack coverage by health insurance plans.93 One author de-
scribed how couples pay for the expensive treatment as follows: "The
first step usually involves exhausting their savings. The next step is
signing up for a host of credit cards and charging up to their credit
limit. If they can, they usually then borrow from relatives or friends."
9 4
At roughly $60,000 per live birth,9 5 the price of a child can certainly
break the bank, but for many prospective parents, the chance to con-
ceive outweighs any price tag.
However, couples that pay for infertility treatment out of pocket
can find compensation for these expenses in another area. In the
next section, this Note will examine why the nature of fertility treat-
ments creates an ideal situation for the use of a federal income tax
deduction for medical expenses. The remainder of this Note focuses
on both the use and implications of such a deduction in the context
of assisted reproductive technology.
A. The U.S. Federal Income Tax System
9 6
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution allows Congress to "lay and col-
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises .... ,,97 Since its inception, the
modern income tax has become the federal government's primary
source of revenue. In the year 2000, individual income taxes
amounted to $1.1 trillion dollars in revenue, or 53% of the total reve-
nue of all tax collections.
98
Yet this amount could be greater. The government has purposely
chosen not to tax the entirety of an individual's gross income. The
Internal Revenue Service taxes only the taxable income of the tax-
93 Yamamoto & Moore, supra note 32, at 104.
94 Id. at 104 n.43 (quoting Esther B. Fein, Calling Infertility a Disease, Couples Battle
with Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, at Al).
95 For a discussion on the costs and success of ART, see supra Part I.
96 This extremely simplified view of the federal income tax system is meant to be
the broadest of summaries. I do not suggest that this begins to address the
complexities of the marginal and progressive rate systems, the differences between
itemized or above-the-line deductions, or the decision of taxpayers to itemize their
deductions. For greater detail on these subjects, see Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal
Deductions-A Tax "Ideal" or Just Another "Deal"?, 2002 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 1.
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
98 GUNN & WARD, supra note 9, at 5. Other tax collections come from corporate
income tax, employment taxes, estate and gift taxes, and excise taxes. Id.
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payer, and not the gross income-essentially all acquired wealth over
a taxable year. 99
Taxable income is calculated by subtracting a taxpayer's deduc-
tions from their gross income. 100 Generally, subject to limitations, the
Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to take deductions for cer-
tain nonbusiness expenditures and losses.' 01 These deductions are
called "personal deductions."10 2 Examples of personal deductions in-
clude deductions for alimony, charitable contributions, and medical
costs. 103 By deducting, or subtracting, these deductions from a tax-
payer's total amount of gross income, the taxpayer is left with a
smaller taxable income. The Internal Revenue Code will tax this
lesser taxable income, essentially forfeiting the deductions that the
Code could levy a tax upon if they were to tax the entire amount of a
taxpayer's gross income.
These revenue losses resulting from federal tax provisions may be
characterized as tax expenditures.10 4 A tax expenditure is a feature of
the tax law that exists to further some nontax goal or to aid taxpayers
in special circumstances. 0 5 Expenditures may take the form of (1)
exclusions, exemptions, and deductions; (2) preferential tax rates; (3)
credits; and (4) deferrals of tax.' 0 6 Expenditures may be viewed as the
equivalent of a simultaneous collection of revenue and a direct
budget outlay of the same amount to the taxpayer.' 0 7 As such, one
may characterize an expenditure as a form of subsidy by the federal
government. Because tax expenditures are generally enacted as per-
manent legislation, it is important that they be given periodic consid-
eration to determine whether they continue to meet the goals for
their establishment.
10 8
B. I.tKC. § 213: The Medical Expense Deduction
One example of such a tax expenditure is the deduction for med-
ical expenses from personal taxable income. The income tax deduc-
tion for medical expenses was created over sixty years ago under I.R.C.





104 See id. at 165.
105 Id.
106 COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 94th CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES 2 (Comm. Print 1976).
107 Id. at 1.
108 Id. at 2.
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§ 213(a). 10 9 This provision of the Internal Revenue Code states that
"there shall be allowed as a deduction the expenses paid during the
taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for med-
ical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent ... to the extent
that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income." 110
Section 213 allows a taxpayer to deduct expenses for medical care
of the taxpayer, his spouse, or his dependents if insurance does not
cover such expenses.1 11 Qualified expenses can be deducted only to
the extent that they exceed 7.5% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross in-
come, and only if the taxpayer elects to itemize his deductions.
1 12
The § 213 tax deduction will cover expenses for fertility treat-
ment' 13 to the extent that such treatment is not covered by insurance,
and to the extent that the treatment exceeds 7.5% of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income. As discussed previously, insurance rarely cov-
ers fertility treatment. 114 The high cost of such treatment will often
place these expenses above a taxpayer's 7.5% income floor.
1 1 5
Additionally, the IRS has made it clear in both the text of the
Code and in a supplemental publication that fertility treatment quali-
fies as a medical expense for the use of the deduction. Section
213(d) (1) (A) defines medical care as amounts paid "for the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the pur-
pose of affecting any structure or function of the body."'1 1 6 As dis-
cussed previously, courts have struggled over whether to call infertility
a disease." 7 However, fertility treatment certainly seems to satisfy the
requirement of medical care paid for the purpose of affecting a func-
tion of the body. In the instance of fertility treatment, such expenses
affect the function of reproduction. As such, the plain language of
§ 213 supports the belief that the deduction covers fertility treatment
expenses.
109 Louis Alan Talley, Medical Expense Deduction: History and Rationale for Past
Changes, 2001 CRS REP. FOR CONG. 1, 2.
110 I.R.C. § 213(a) (2000).
111 Id.
112 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 63(d) (explaining itemized deductions).
113 See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
114 See supra Part II.A. Patients bear 85% of the costs of fertility treatment out of
pocket. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
115 See supra Part I. As a whole, medical expenses must amount to over 7.5% of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income to qualify for the deduction. The 7.5% is a floor;
only expenses that exceed this 7.5% base of adjusted gross income are counted for the
deduction. See I.R.C. § 213(a).
116 I.R.C. § 213 (d)(1)(A).
117 See supra Part II.B.1.
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The IRS addressed this interpretation of § 213 in Publication 502,
Medical and Dental Expenses,1 8 by answering the question: "What Medi-
cal Expenses are Deductible?"'"19 In an extensive list of deductible ex-
penses, the IRS includes "Fertility Enhancement."' 20 It states that a
taxpayer "can include in medical expenses the cost of
[p]rocedures such as in vitro fertilization . . .[and] surgery ....
Both the language of the statute and Publication 502 support the claim
that a taxpayer may deduct medical expenses for fertility enhance-
ment, and this deduction appears to include all methods of assisted
reproductive technology.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF USING I.R.C. § 213 To DEDUCT EXPENSES FOR
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
While the plain language of both the Code and Publication 502
support the conclusion that fertility treatments may be deducted
under the medical expense deduction, it is important to consider the
implications of using the deduction to subsidize any and all fertility
treatment.
A. Legislative History of I.C. § 213
In 1942, Congress introduced the individual income tax deduc-
tion for medical expenses into the tax Code. 122 Congress created the
deduction during the World War II era to help taxpayers provide for
essential medical services and to keep taxpayers from delaying medi-
cal treatment. 2 3 In congressional hearings, Tax Adviser Randolph E.
Paul testified that "'a deduction should be allowed for extraordinary
medical expenses that are in excess of a specified percentage of a fam-
ily's net income."124 He also testified that the amount should be lim-
ited to a specified maximum. 125 In order to be deductible under the
original statute, medical expenses had to exceed 5% of a taxpayer's
118 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 502, MEDI-
CAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES (2002). The U.S. Treasury Department creates such publi-
cations to aid the taxpayer in preparing annual returns. See id. at 1.
119 Id. at 4-12.
120 Id. at 6.
121 Id.
122 Talley, supra note 109, at 2.
123 See id. at 3.
124 Id. (quoting Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1942 Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th Cong. 1612 (1942) (statement of Randolph
E. Paul, Tax Advisor to the Sec'y of the Treasury)).
125 Id.
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net income and were limited to a maximum deduction of $2500.126
The 5% floor meant that taxpayers could deduct only the medical ex-
penses that were truly "extraordinary," yet the $2500 ceiling reduced
the revenue loss associated with the deduction. 127 The medical ex-
pense deduction began, and remains, as an exception to the general
rule that personal expenses should not be deductible. 128
In the six decades since the original enactment of I.R.C. § 213,
both the floor and the ceiling on the deduction have undergone ex-
tensive change. This Note will first trace the legislative history behind
the floor of the deduction.
1. Section 213's Threshold Floor
Shortly after the deduction's original enactment, the legislature
adjusted the threshold limitation. 129 The Revenue Act of 1951 re-
moved the 5% limitation for medical expenses if the taxpayer was over
age sixty-five.1 30 In passing this amendment, the Committee on Fi-
nance saw that the elderly have both a decreased earning capacity and
increased medical expenses, and believed that disallowance of the de-
duction due to a percentage floor could accentuate this hardship.1 3 1
Without a 5% floor, taxpayers over sixty-five years of age could deduct
even the smallest amounts of medical expenses. In 1954, Congress
continued the trend by lowering the threshold for deductibility from
5% to 3% for taxpayers below age sixty-five. 13 2 As such, early legisla-
tive trends apparently aimed to increase the use of the deduction for
medical expenses by lowering the threshold for eligibility.
Yet recent amendments to the medical expense deduction seem
to reflect a change in this policy. In 1982, the eligibility floor for de-
ductible medical expenditures was raised from 3% to 5% of adjusted
gross income. 133 The primary rationale for the change was a concern
that the deduction no longer reflected "'economic hardship, beyond




129 See id. at 4-5.
130 Id. at 4.
131 Id. at 5.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 10. (citing Social Security Amendments of 1965: Report on H.R 6675 Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong. 136-37 (1965)).
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come tax.' '134 In addition, the government did not desire to provide
an incentive for taxpayers to further their health care spending
through extensive deductions for medical expenses. 135 These ratio-
nales carried forth to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, when Congress
increased the floor of the deduction to the present 7.5%.136 The ra-
tionale for increasing the floor was provided by the Joint Committee
on Taxation:
In raising the deduction floor to 7.5 percent of the taxpayer's ad-
justed gross income, the Act retains the benefit of deductibility
where an individual incurs extraordinary medical expenses... that
are not reimbursed through health insurance or Medicare. Thus,
the Act continues deductibility if the unreimbursed expenses for a
year are so great that they absorb a substantial portion of the tax-
payer's income and hence substantially affect the taxpayer's ability
to pay taxes.'
37
The initial amendments to § 213 attempted to expand the use of
the deduction by lowering the threshold floor. In contrast, since
1982, Congress has attempted to limit the use of the deduction by
raising the floor for eligibility. Currently, taxpayers must spend more
than 7.5% of their adjusted gross income on medical expenses before
the first dollar of expenses may be taken as a deduction. According to
the legislature, such a floor exists so that taxpayers will only deduct
medical expenses that are large enough to substantially affect taxpay-
ers' ability to pay their income taxes. 138
2. Considerations of Vertical Inequity
Until now, this Note has considered the 7.5% floor for the medi-
cal expense deduction in the abstract. However, using the deduction
for fertility treatment raises interesting effects in its application. As
applied, subsidizing fertility treatment through the medical expense
deduction results in the problem of "vertical inequity." Vertical equity
refers to the relative amount of taxes paid by individuals with different
incomes, and requires that "those with greater ability to pay actually
134 Id. at 11 (quoting JOINT COMM., 9 7 TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FIscAL RESPONSIBILITY AcT oF 1982, at
24-25 (Comm. Print 1983)).
135 See id.
136 Id. at 12.
137 Id. (citing JOINT COMM., 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 50-51 (Comm. Print 1987)).
138 See id.
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pay more tax."139 Accordingly, vertical inequity means that taxpayers
with a lesser ability to pay receive a greater burden of taxation than is
proportional to their ability.1 40 As a policy goal, the Internal Revenue
Code should minimize vertical inequity whenever possible.
1 4 '
However, I.R.C. § 213 promotes vertical inequity by its current
7.5% floor. The Code allows for a personal income tax deduction
only to the extent that medical expenses exceed 7.5% of a taxpayer's
adjusted gross income. In the context of fertility treatment, however,
§ 213 will promote vertical inequity because taxpayers of a higher
bracket are more likely to spend money on expensive, aggressive treat-
ment simply because they have the income to spend. Data supports
the theory that higher income couples spend more of their income on
fertility treatment than lower income couples. 142 This means that the
higher income couples are more likely to exceed the 7.5% threshold
for eligibility to claim the deduction.1 43 Low income taxpayers are
unlikely to qualify for the deduction because they cannot afford to
spend over 7.5% of their income on treatment. As such, the wealthier
infertile taxpayer can both afford expensive, out of pocket ART and
will likely have such treatment subsidized through the tax system,
where her lower income counterpart finds neither benefit. Such verti-
cal inequity contradicts a stated goal of the deduction, which aims to
reflect the individual ability to pay income taxes.
144
139 Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing
Credit, 38 VILL. L. REv. 871, 931 (1993).
140 See id.
141 See Cynthia E. Garabedian, Note, Tax Breaks for Higher Education: Tax Policy or
Tax Pandering?, 18 VA. TAX Rrv. 217, 230 (1998).
142 See Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs,
Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 38 n.109 (2003) (noting the
socioeconomic discrepancies between income and the use of ART).
143 But see James W. Colliton, The Medical Expense Deduction, 34 WAYNE L. REV.
1307, 1310 (1988). Colliton argues that the 7.5% limitation disproportionately bene-
fits low income taxpayers because a low income taxpayer can exceed 7.5% of his ad-
justed gross income with lower medical expenses. He notes that a high income
taxpayer may spend exacdy the same amount on medical care, but receive no deduc-
tion because he has a higher adjusted gross income. See id. While I agree with this
point generally, I believe that these circumstances change in the realm of assisted
reproductive technology. Low income taxpayers generally do not elect to pay for
these expensive, optional treatments, but the wealthy taxpayers who choose to do so
may receive an added benefit from this deduction if their expenses exceed 7.5% of
their income.
144 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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3. Section 213's Cap on Deductibility
In addition to the fluctuating floor, I.R.C. § 213 has undergone
other important amendments throughout its history. Congress en-
acted the medical expense deduction in 1942 with a cap; the maxi-
mum deduction allowed for married taxpayers was $2500.145 This
monetary ceiling was created to prevent incentives for extravagant
health care spending.
1 46
From its creation in the 1940s until the 1960s, this ceiling was
gradually heightened to reflect inflation and the rising costs of health
care. 147 In 1965, Congress eliminated the ceiling for the deduction
entirely. 148 Yet in eliminating the ceiling, Congress continued to ex-
press concern over creating incentives for extravagant medical ex-
penses.' 49 While the legislature was initially concerned with taxpayers
using a limitless deduction as an incentive for medical spending, the
current state of the deduction appears to reflect the realities of an
increasingly expensive health care system.
4. Risks of Unlimited Fertility Treatment
In a historical context, the present incarnation of § 213 is unique
in that it lacks a ceiling. What this means in the realm of fertility treat-
ment deserves consideration. In theory, a taxpayer can spend an un-
limited amount of money on fertility treatment, and so long as the
treatment exceeds 7.5% of her gross income, she can continue to de-
duct each dollar over the 7.5% base.
However, an unlimited subsidy for fertility treatment may not re-
flect the goals of this expenditure. Many risks accompany ART, and
these risks increase with the incidents of fertility treatment.15 0 The
likelihood of multiple births and the health complications that accom-
pany such births increase with the use of ART.' 51 In this country,
145 Talley, supra note 109, at 2. The maximum deduction for single taxpayers was
$1250. Id. at 3 (citing Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 77th Cong. 1613 (1942)).
146 See id.
147 See id. at 2-9.
148 See id. at 9.
149 See id. at 10 (citing Social Security Amendments of 1965: Report on H.R. 6675 Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong. 136-37 (1965)).
150 See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Bio-
medical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 603 (suggesting that society should "reconsider
the safety and effectiveness of fertility drugs in order to combat some of the continu-
ing problems arising from the overly aggressive use of assisted reproductive technolo-
gies, especially the health hazards associated with multifetal pregnancies").
151 Id. at 618-24.
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three or more embryos are transferred in 80% of ART cycles; 152 as a
result, over one-third of the IVF births in this country result in multi-
ple births.1 53 Such multiple births generate higher costs than single
births-the result of higher incidents of complications. 154 The aver-
age cost for a twin delivery is four times higher than for a single birth,
and charges for a triplet delivery are eleven times higher, averaging
over $100,000.155 It seems problematic that the subsidy of one set of
medical expenses may promote further medical expenses if successful.
Drawbacks to unlimited fertility treatment exist. ART procedures
raise a variety of safety concerns for the mother, including chronic
side effects associated with fertility drugs, an increase in the risks of
certain cancers, complications with the harvesting procedure, and
higher rates of ectopic pregnancies. 156 ARTs are "hardly innocuous
medical interventions." 157 Beyond physical concerns, the psychologi-
cal anguish and heartbreak of couples that undergo extensive fertility
treatment increases pressure on the family relationship with each pass-
ing month. 158 In addition, moral and religious objections exist to the
use of technology that may dispose of fertilized embryos as part of the
treatment method.
159
Certainly, millions of couples voluntarily choose to undergo these
risks for the chance at the immeasurable reward of having a child. Yet
it is a separate consideration whether the federal government should
allow an unlimited, uncapped financial benefit to certain couples who
elect to undergo procedures with considerable risks. As the legisla-
ture intended to alleviate the costs of health care by eliminating any
caps to the medical expense deduction, the implications of unlimited
fertility treatment should be considered in evaluating whether § 213
meets its policy goals in this context.
B. Judicial Interpretation: "Functional Adequacy"
Until now, this Note has assumed that any fertility treatment may
be easily defined as a medical expense. In reality, the scope of what
the IRS will allow as a medical expense, as well as what they should
allow, is unclear.




156 Noah, supra note 150, at 620-21.
157 Id. at 621.
158 See McKee, supra note 3, at 192.
159 See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 2375-2379 (2d ed. 2000).
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The judiciary has addressed the scope of § 213 in contexts other
than fertility treatment. Generally, taxpayers may take a deduction for
medical expenses no greater than the minimum reasonable cost of
"functionally adequate" treatment.' 60 For example, a taxpayer with a
spinal disorder may deduct the cost of installing a pool at her home
for daily swim therapy, but cannot deduct costs attributable to archi-
tectural or aesthetic compatibility of the pool with her home.
1 61
The scope of the medical expense deduction presents a problem
in the infertility context, where no quantifiable adequacy exists if the
only possible "cure" is a successful pregnancy. Couples spend hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars on treatments that may carry medical
risks along with the chance for success. 162  Defining these limits
seems to present a problem in the context of infertility, where "func-
tionally adequate" may mean nothing short of any medical expense it
takes to bear a child.
V. SUGGESTIONS TO BOTH RESTRAIN AND INCREASE THE
DEDUCTIBILITY OF ART
I.R.C. § 213 allows for the deduction of medical expenses not cov-
ered by a taxpayer's insurance. 163 Section 213 only allows for a deduc-
tion to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5% of a taxpayer's
adjusted gross income-yet taxpayers may deduct an unlimited
amount of expenses once they pass this threshold.' 64 Infertility treat-
ment presents unique issues for the § 213 deduction. The high costs
of this elective treatment, along with the 7.5% threshold, place the
deduction out of reach for most low income taxpayers. 16 5 This leads
to a problem of vertical inequity, where wealthy taxpayers are more
likely to receive a subsidy for ART than lower income taxpayers be-
160 Ferris v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[A]ny costs above
those necessary to produce a functionally adequate facility are not incurred 'for medi-
cal care.'").
161 See id.
162 See, e.g., Noah, supra note 150, at 603 (arguing that we should "reconsider the
safety and effectiveness of fertility drugs in order to combat some of the continuing
problems arising from the overly aggressive use of assisted reproductive technologies,
especially the health hazards associated with multifetal pregnancies"); Sherri A. Jay-
son, Comment, "Loving Infertile Couple Seeks Woman Age 18-31 to Help Have Baby. $6,500
Plus Expenses and a Gift ": Should We Regulate the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technologies by
Older Women?, 11 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 327, 327-31 (2001) (discussing the extreme
costs of ART).
163 I.R.C. § 213(a) (2000).
164 Id.; see also Ron West, Diagnose Payments for Bigger Medical Expense Deductions, 62
PRAc. TAX STRATEGIES 289, 289 (1999).
165 See Bender, supra note 142, at 38 n.109.
1138 [VOL- 79:3
2004] I.R.C. § 213 AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 1139
cause the wealthy can afford to spend a greater percentage of their
income on elective treatment. Such vertical inequity seems contrary
to the deduction's purpose-to reflect a taxpayer's ability to pay.
Besides the current floor, there is the issue of a deduction that
has no limit. Congress eliminated the historical cap on § 213 in part
to reflect the rising costs of health care. But, in the context of infertil-
ity, the drawbacks of encouraging infinite fertility treatment must be
considered when assessing the deduction. Unlimited use of ART risks
the physical and emotional well being of infertile women.166 The like-
lihood of costly and dangerous multiple births also increases with the
use of ART.' 67 An unlimited subsidy for fertility treatment seems con-
trary to an expenditure which aims to alleviate taxpayer burdens, not
to aggravate them.
It is firmly established that § 213 will be used to deduct medical
expenses for fertility treatment. Yet the unique nature of fertility tech-
nology supports certain oversight of the amount of money a taxpayer
should deduct for these expenses. Ultimately, we may look to judicial
interpretation of the deduction itself for the answer. The judiciary
has interpreted § 213 as a way to alleviate the burden for functionally
adequate treatment of a disease or illness,168 rather than as a blank check
for unlimited elective treatment.
As such, taxpayers who intend to use the deduction for fertility
treatment should do so with written consent from a physician.' 69 The
physician must use his or her best medical judgment to determine
what level of treatment constitutes functional adequacy, and this will
vary given the circumstances of the patient. For instance, a physician
may consent to a deduction for more rounds of ART for a young,
healthy female then for a woman past her childbearing years. The
physician would determine the line between functionally adequate
fertility and where such procedures become purely optional or even
experimental. Such a distinction does not prohibit any infertile
couple from purchasing as much fertility treatment as they choose,
but it may address the problems of an unlimited federal subsidy for
treatment that carries risks of harm along with the chance for good.
Additionally, if § 213 is intended to reflect a taxpayer's ability to
pay, then the floor that acts as a gatekeeper to deny access to low
166 See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
168 See Ferris v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d. 1112, 1116-18 (7th Cir. 1978).
169 Currently, taxpayers must qualify such expenses as medical only if the IRS con-
ducts an audit on the taxpayer. Ordinarily, taxpayers do not have the burden ofjusti-
fying medical expenses in order to take the deduction. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
supra note 118, at 19.
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income taxpayers must be reduced. While fertility treatment remains
costly and insurance coverage appears unlikely in the near future,
some solace for couples that wish to undergo expensive treatment ex-
ists under the medical expense deduction. However, low income
couples may find a 7.5% barrier too high to take advantage of its assis-
tance. As such, this barrier should be lowered to increase access to
the deduction for couples otherwise unable to benefit from the cur-
rent deduction. Lowering the floor would open the use of the deduc-
tion for a greater number of taxpayers struck by the medical
catastrophe of infertility.
CONCLUSION
Infertility is a prevalent and growing problem in this country.
170
While infertile couples have an ever-increasing number of treatment
options to choose from,17 1 most insurance companies have refused to
cover such medical expenses.1 72 As a result, couples pay for the ex-
pensive procedures largely out of pocket. 173 The taxpayer may allevi-
ate the burden of costly fertility treatment by using the medical
expense deduction of I.R.C. § 213. The current state of the law sug-
gests that a taxpayer may claim unlimited expenses for fertility tech-
nology, but only if the taxpayer can afford to spend over 7.5% percent
of his or her income on such treatment.1 74 Problems arise when using
the deduction as a blank check to compensate taxpayers for their elec-
tive procedures; the deduction should be capped at a level consistent
with a physician's assessment of medical adequacy. Yet the purpose
behind the deduction has always been to compensate taxpayers en-
countering unforeseen medical expenses. The floor of the deduction
should be lowered to increase equality in tax benefits across all in-
come classes, and such lowering follows the deduction's legislative
history.
Ideally, these two suggestions reconcile the unique implications
of using I.R.C. § 213 to subsidize assisted reproductive technology.
While infertility remains an oppressive barrier to the dreams of many
Americans, our nation's tax policies must be subject to consistent eval-
uation to ensure that they address the needs of all people in the
healthiest possible manner.
170 See supra note 1.
171 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
172 See supra Part II.A.
173 Yamamoto & Moore, supra note 32, at 104.
174 See West, supra note 164, at 289.
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